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What Is a Big Bureaucracy?
Reﬂ ections on Rebuilding Leviathan 
and Runaway State-building
SCOTT GEHLBACH*
University of Wisconsin-Madison
My interest in post-communism dates to my years in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary in the mid-1990s, part of which I spent as a guest of the Czech Insti-
tute of Sociology. To have the opportunity to discuss two wonderful books about 
these and neighbouring countries in the pages of Sociologický časopis/Czech Socio-
logical Review is therefore a special privilege. Anna Grzymała-Busse’s Rebuilding 
Leviathan [Grzymała-Busse 2007] and Conor O’Dwyer’s Runaway State-building 
[O’Dwyer 2006] remind me of what attracted me then to the region: the oppor-
tunity to witness the unwinding of socialism, the great social experiment of the 
20th century, and the suspense about what would emerge in its place.
Like Grzymała-Busse and O’Dwyer, I have become convinced over the past 
years that understanding why post-communist states evolved as they did is criti-
cal to explaining the divergent fortunes of countries in the region. In the process, 
I have wrestled with the question of what makes one state more effective than 
another. Obviously there is no one answer to this question, but any investigation 
must include the sheer number of individuals in the administrative apparatus. In 
work with David Brown and John Earle (two leading experts on post-communist 
privatisation), for example, I ﬁ nd that plausibly exogenous variation in the size of 
regional bureaucracies in Russia helps to explain cross-regional variation in the 
impact of privatisation on ﬁ rm performance [Brown, Earle and Gehlbach 2008].1
Viewing Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-building through the prism 
of my own experience, I was therefore struck by the centrality of a seemingly sim-
ple issue: how to measure the size and growth of bureaucracies. Both Grzymała-
Busse and O’Dwyer are meticulous in their compilation of data on administrative 
employment. As they each emphasise, however, the issue extends beyond valid 
* Direct all correspondence to: Scott Gehlbach, Associate Professor of Political Science, 
University of Wisconsin–Madison, 110 North Hall, 1050 Bascom Mall, Madison, WI 53706, 
e-mail: gehlbach@polisci.wisc.edu. I am grateful to Maria Belodubrovskaya, John Earle, 
and Pieter Vanhuysse for many useful comments on this paper, and to David Brown and 
John Earle for their collaboration on the project that informs much of the argument here.
1 Spoiler alert: We estimate that privatisation is more effective in regions with relatively 
large bureaucracies, the apparent consequence of a relatively hospitable post-privatisation 
business environment in those regions.
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and reliable measures of the number of bureaucrats. Bureaucracies are large or 
small relative to what they are asked to do. 
In our work on Russian bureaucracy and privatisation effectiveness, David 
Brown, John Earle, and I found that in measuring bureaucracy size it was critical 
to account for economies of scale in state administration. More populous regions 
generally have fewer bureaucrats per capita than less populous regions, a rela-
tionship that I document below. Because regional population might also exert an 
independent effect on the relative performance of privatised ﬁ rms (e.g. through 
attractiveness to investors), failing to control for economies of scale in state ad-
ministration could bias the estimated effect of bureaucracy size on privatisation 
effectiveness.
In principle, the same relationship should hold across countries. To take a 
simple example, each country needs only one central bank chief. It would there-
fore be inappropriate to say that Estonia’s central bank chiefdom (1 chief per 
1 300 000 residents) is larger than Russia’s (1 chief per 142 000 000 residents). Of 
course, the difference would not be so stark if we looked at all central bank em-
ployees, as a large country will generally need more staff than a small one. But 
some economies of scale are likely.
In this note, I expand upon this perspective, using data on regional variation 
in bureaucratic employment in Russia to illustrate the importance of accounting 
for economies of scale in state administration. I then show how this approach 
can add to our understanding of the East European states discussed in Rebuilding 
Leviathan and Runaway State-building. 
In focusing on the size of bureaucracies, I ignore a range of other issues 
covered by Grzymała-Busse and O’Dwyer: institutional design, the distribution 
of administrative positions across parties, bureaucratic turnover and compensa-
tion, and so forth. I do so not because I believe these issues are less important, 
but because I have less to say about them. I also largely skirt the issue of what is 
responsible for changes in the size of state administrations, the central focus of 
both books, though I will have a bit to say about one potential explanation that I 
believe deserves further attention.
Economies of scale in Russian state administration 
The theoretical justiﬁ cation for economies of scale in state administration is 
straightforward: administrative labour is a critical input into public-goods pro-
duction, and the consumption and distribution of public goods are characterised 
by economies of scale. To the extent that state administration employees are en-
gaged in public-goods production – stafﬁ ng anti-monopoly and environmental 
protection agencies, for example – we should therefore observe fewer bureaucrats 
per capita in more populous political units.
The argument can be seen most clearly by considering the ideal type of a 
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public good, where what economists refer to as ‘jointness of supply’ is extreme.2 
The cost of producing such goods is ﬁ xed, so that ‘each individual’s consump-
tion…leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that 
good’ [Samuelson 1954: 387]. The larger the number of individuals who consume 
the good, the lower the per-capita cost of their production. In particular, if the 
participation of a ﬁ xed number of bureaucrats is necessary to produce a public 
good that can be enjoyed by all residents of a region, then the per-capita cost of 
producing that good – measured as bureaucrats per capita – will be less in more 
populous regions.
Figure 1 illustrates this tendency using data from 1995 on state administra-
tion employment at the regional level in Russia.3 There is a clear negative re-
2 Public goods are also characterised by ‘non-excludability’, such that it is impossible to 
exclude individuals from their consumption. Non-excludability is a classic rationale for 
the government provision of public goods, as such goods may not be provided by the 
market.
3 Data are from Rosstat, the Russian state statistical agency. Regional data on state admin-
istration employment are unavailable before 1995; the depicted relationship is quite simi-
Figure 1. Economies of scale in Russian state administration
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lationship between regional population and state administration employment 
per capita. Chukotka, the smallest region in the dataset, had 16 bureaucrats per 
1000 residents in 1995. The city of Moscow, the largest region in Russia, had only 
3.4. The ﬁ t is tight: fully 70% of regional variation in the number of bureaucrats 
per capita is accounted for by economies of scale in state administration.
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the main point: failure to account for econo-
mies of scale in state administration may result in misleading characterisations 
of bureaucracies as ‘small’ or ‘large’. For each ﬁ gure, I divide regions into three 
groups of equal size, corresponding to bureaucracies that are relatively ‘small’, 
lar for later years. State administration employment is deﬁ ned as employment in federal, 
regional, and local public administration per 1000 residents. Employees in the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches of government are included, with the exception of per-
sonnel in the Ministries of Interior and Defense. Approximately three-quarters of these 
employees are classiﬁ ed as civil servants, with the remainder secretaries, drivers, and 
other support staff [Brym and Gimpelson 2004]. Data from 2004 suggest little systematic 
variation across regions in the ratio between the two.
Figure 2. Regional variation in Russian bureaucracy
No data
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Large
Relative size
of bureaucracy
Notes: Data from 1995. ‘Small’, ‘medium’, and ‘large’ are deﬁ ned as the corresponding 
terciles of log state administration employment per 1000 residents.
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‘medium’, and ‘large’, respectively. Figure 2 depicts this classiﬁ cation using data 
on the number of bureaucrats per capita, unadjusted for economies of scale in 
state administration. Figure 3 depicts the analogous classiﬁ cation using data that 
adjust for economies of scale in state administration, that is, the residuals from 
a regression of log state administration employment (per capita) on log popula-
tion.4 
Differences in shading in Figures 2 and 3 indicate that a region switches 
classiﬁ cation after adjusting for economies of scale in state administration. For 
some regions, the difference can be substantial. Sverdlovsk, for example, gov-
erned from 1976 to 1985 by Boris Yeltsin, was the eleventh-smallest bureaucracy 
in Russia in 1995 before accounting for economies of scale in state administration, 
but the ﬁ fteenth-largest after doing so. More broadly, if we do not control for 
4 In other words, the data used for Figure 3 are the difference between actual and pre-
dicted state administration employment per capita in Figure 1.
Figure 3.  Regional variation in Russian bureaucracy, adjusting for economies of scale 
in state administration
No data
Small
Medium
Large
Relative size
of bureaucracy
Notes: Data from 1995. ‘Small’, ‘medium’, and ‘large’ are deﬁ ned as the corresponding 
terciles of the residuals from a regression of log state administration employment per 
1000 residents on log population.
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population in this way, we miss the generally large scale of bureaucracies in west-
ern Siberia and underestimate the relative size of bureaucracies in much of the 
south of European Russia. Overall, the pairwise correlation of the two underlying 
measures of bureaucracy size is 0.54.
Measuring bureaucracy size and bureaucratic growth in Eastern Europe
To what extent is variation in the size of bureaucracies across East European 
countries accounted for by economies of scale in state administration like those 
observed at the regional level in Russia? To answer this question, I use the cross-
national data reported in Table B.5 of Rebuilding Leviathan, which are based on 
government statistical ofﬁ ce reporting of data for category L of the Statistical 
Classiﬁ cation of Economic Activities in the European Union (NACE). Below 
I discuss related data from Runaway State-building, which examines a smaller set 
of countries.
Figure 4 plots the relationship between bureaucracy per capita and popu-
lation in 1992 (the ﬁ rst year for which data are available for all nine countries 
covered in Rebuilding Leviathan) and 2004. Although the number of observations 
is small, in both years there is evidence of economies of scale in state administra-
tion, reﬂ ected in the negative relationship between the two variables. The slopes 
are quite similar: –0.195 (SE = 0.159) in 1992 and –0.184 (SE = 0.086) in 2004. 
Beyond this general resemblance, there are two important differences be-
tween 1992 and 2004. First, there is a secular increase in bureaucracy size during 
this period: the regression line jumps upward. This development is consistent 
with the notion that an increase in state administrative capacity was necessary 
during the transition period to compensate for the withdrawal of the Communist 
Party (under socialism, many administrative tasks were carried out by the Party 
rather than the state) and to provide institutional support for the market econo-
my. It is also consistent with a generalised desire to exploit the state for political 
reasons, as described in Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-building.
Second, there is a much tighter ﬁ t around the regression line in 2004 than in 
1992.5 Wherever they started, post-communist bureaucracies seemed to converge 
during the transition period to a size consistent with their population. Thus, 
Hungary – which started the transition period with a relatively large bureauc-
racy, given its population – added few state administration employees between 
1992 and 2004. In contrast, Bulgaria’s bureaucracy grew by leaps and bounds, 
nearly catching up to its predicted level by 2004.
Figure 4 suggests another way of looking at bureaucratic growth in post-
communist countries: did a country converge to or diverge from the level pre-
5 The R-squared statistic for the 1992 regression is 0.18, versus 0.39 for the 2004 regres-
sion.
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dicted by its population, given the secular increase in bureaucracy size during 
the transition period? Viewed from this perspective, only two countries exhibit 
patterns of growth inconsistent with convergence: Latvia and Slovakia. Begin-
ning the transition period with a relatively small bureaucracy, Latvia overshoots 
the mark, so that in 2004 its bureaucracy is larger than that predicted by its popu-
lation. In contrast, the absolute change in the size of Slovakia’s bureaucracy is 
limited enough that by 2004 it has the smallest bureaucracy in the region, once 
economies of scale in state administration are accounted for.
We would, of course, see different patterns if we plotted data for differ-
ent time periods. As Seán Hanley notes in his review in this issue, for example, 
most of the increase in Slovakia’s bureaucracy reported in Rebuilding Leviathan 
occurred between 1989 and 1992, and so that change is not picked up in Fig-
ure 4. Moreover, other data sources may provide a different picture. The data in 
Runaway State-building suggest that the fastest growth in the Slovak state admin-
istration took place later, from 1994 to 1997. To the extent that is the case, Slova-
kia’s ‘relative’ growth during the period examined here might have been positive 
rather than negative. 
Figure 4. Economies of scale in East European state administration
987
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
Log population, 1992
Lo
g 
st
at
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
pe
r 
10
00
 r
es
id
en
ts
, 1
99
2
1110 987
Log population, 2004
1110
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
Lo
g 
st
at
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
pe
r 
10
00
 r
es
id
en
ts
, 2
00
4
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 44, No. 6
1196
Notwithstanding these caveats, the approach to measuring bureaucratic 
size and growth presented here suggests new questions about state-building in 
both the socialist and post-socialist eras and so points to a research agenda that 
moves beyond Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-building. I turn to these 
questions in the following section.
Unanswered questions
For both their empirical and theoretical contributions, Rebuilding Leviathan and 
Runaway State-building will serve as the starting point for future research on East 
European state-building. For those who would work in this literature, let me pro-
pose three questions for which I believe we do not yet have complete answers:
1.  Why did some post-communist countries inherit bureaucracies that were bigger (ad-
justing for economies of scale in state administration) than others? Hungary’s posi-
tion as an outlier in Figure 4 suggests that the degree of market reform under 
socialism may have played a role, though that explanation does not work so 
well for some other countries in the sample.6 In general, the better we un-
derstand the sources of variation in socialist-era bureaucracies, the better we 
can identify the impact on transition outcomes of variation in post-socialist 
bureaucracies.
2.  Is the convergence to a common bureaucracy size (adjusting for economies of scale 
in state administration) a long-term trend affecting most or all countries in the re-
gion? This is really two questions: will the pattern identiﬁ ed here hold over 
time, and does it hold for other countries in the region? To the extent that the 
answer to both questions is yes, we may want to revisit the ‘functionalist’ ex-
planations for variation in bureaucratic growth generally discounted by both 
Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-building.
3.  What forces drive convergence to a common bureaucracy size (adjusting for economies 
of scale in state administration), and how do those forces interact with the institu-
tional factors identiﬁ ed by Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-building? 
In some contexts – economic growth, for example – the cause of convergence 
is clear. To the extent that post-communist bureaucracies are converging to 
a common size, the mechanism is less obvious. Intuitively, it seems that ex-
ternal inﬂ uence must be a factor, and indeed Rebuilding Leviathan documents 
that pressure from the European Union played an important (if late) role in 
constraining exploitation of the state in countries with weak party competi-
6 Following Rebuilding Leviathan, for Poland and Hungary I used data for which the re-
porting unit is household rather than establishment [Grzymała-Busse 2007: 234]. If instead 
I use establishment data for these two countries, then Hungary is less of an outlier. As 
before, however, there is strong evidence of economies of scale in state administration in 
both 1992 and 2004, with an increase in ﬁ t from the ﬁ rst year to the second.
Scott Gehlbach: What Is a Big Bureaucracy?
1197
tion. At the same time, the discussion of regional decentralisation in Runaway 
State-building shows that external inﬂ uence and domestic considerations often 
interact in unexpected ways. 
Convincing answers to these questions will advance our understanding of 
post-communist state-building, and of the state more generally, beyond the high-
water mark set by Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-building.
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are most often cited as the causes behind the growing market segmentation.
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